Strengthening Digital Rights for Persons with Disabilities and Older Persons

By Tsion Meingstu and Paul Kimumwe |

As part of efforts to strengthen the integration of digital inclusion and digital accessibility for persons with disabilities and older persons into its human rights monitoring and oversight mandate, the Ethiopia Human Rights Commission (EHRC) held a two-day capacity-building workshop for its staff on September 21st and 22nd, 2026.

The workshop, which was facilitated by experts from the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), sought to equip participants with foundational knowledge and skills in digital accessibility and inclusion, how to design and implement monitoring checklists for the digital rights of persons with disabilities and older persons, and how to communicate and advocate for the digital rights of persons with disabilities and older persons.

The staff capacity building workshop was one of the Commission’s key deliverables under a ten-month grant from CIPESA’s Africa Digital Rights Fund (ADRF). Other activities under the grant include monitoring and assessing the impact of digital technologies’ (in)accessibility on the daily lives of older persons and persons with disabilities, and organising advocacy activities to raise awareness of digital rights for persons with disabilities and older persons among relevant government and non-government stakeholders to foster inclusive practices.

During the workshop, Shimels Ashagre, Senior Human Rights Officer for Disability Rights and Rights of Older Persons at the EHRC, presented a draft monitoring toolkit developed as part of the grant that will be used to assess the state of digital inclusion for persons with disabilities and older persons in Ethiopia.

The toolkit is organised around eight key dimensions of digital inclusion, with specific questions tailored to both persons with disabilities and older persons. It draws on the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), the UN Principles for Older Persons, the Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing (MIPAA), the African Union Protocol on the Rights of Older Persons, and the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG 3.0).

The Commission will use the findings from the assessment to inform the design and implementation of advocacy activities about the digital rights of persons with disabilities and older persons.

Opening the workshop, the thematic Commissioner for Disability Rights and Rights of Older Persons, Mohammed Ahmed, emphasised that the world is undergoing rapid digital transformation, with technology increasingly shaping how people access information, services, and opportunities. While these advancements bring significant benefits, they also raise important human rights considerations that must not be overlooked.

He stressed that particular attention should be given to the rights of vulnerable groups, including persons with disabilities and older persons, who often face barriers to accessing and benefiting from digital technologies. Commissioner Mohammed underscored that digital inclusion and accessibility are not merely technical issues but fundamental human rights concerns that require deliberate action from governments, institutions, and other stakeholders.

Dr Wairagala Wakabi, the Executive Director of CIPESA, noted that digital inclusion for persons with disabilities and older persons has become a central thematic area for CIPESA, which is why it partners with institutions such as the EHRC to strengthen their capacity to monitor and promote digital inclusion. He noted that through the ADRF, CIPESA provides financial and technical support to organisations that are championing digital inclusion.

For example, in the last round of the ADRF grant, USD 320,000 was awarded to 18 initiatives in 14 countries to support efforts to advance digital rights, inclusion, and online safety. Three of the recipients, including Ethiopia’s Human Rights Commission, the Zimbabwe Council for the Blind, and the Rwanda-based Organisation d’Integration et de Promotion des Personnes Atteintes d’Albinisme (OIPPA), are focusing on Digital Accessibility for Persons with Disabilities and Older Persons.

Dr Wakabi noted that for effective advocacy around digital rights, participants need to understand how digital technologies intersect and affect the rights of persons with disabilities. And for Human Rights Commissions, this understanding helps them to integrate digital rights into their monitoring and oversight mandates of human rights.

Reactions from the participants:

“The training was very fascinating. I gained a tremendous amount of knowledge about digital rights and how they are directly related to human rights and their intersection. This was beginner-friendly training that provided participants with a foundational experience in the field.” Female participant

“Overall, the training was highly informative and educational. Prior to attending the training, I did not have a clear understanding of the concept of digital technologies and their practical applications. However, the training helped me develop a solid understanding of the subject and enhanced my knowledge of key digital concepts.” Male participant

The sessions on digital rights, as well as the rights of older persons and persons with disabilities, significantly broadened my perspective and enhanced my understanding of inclusion and accessibility from a digital technologies’ perspective. The knowledge gained has provided me with a clear framework for integrating these concepts into my future work, particularly on emerging issues related to the rights and participation of older persons and persons with disabilities.

Additionally, the training focus on Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence (TFGBV) offered valuable and thought-provoking insights into an important and evolving area. Overall, the training was highly informative, practical, and relevant to my professional responsibilities.”

The training was attended by 18 individuals (10 men and 8 women) drawn from various departments of the commission, including the Disability Rights and Rights of Older Persons Department, Human Rights Education Department, Women and Children’s Rights Department, Office of the Chief Commissioner, Monitoring and Investigation Department, and the Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons, and Migrants’ Rights Department.

CIPESA at the KTA Annual Africa Technology and Intellectual Property Symposium 2026

By Update |

The annual gathering brings together legal practitioners, policymakers, technology innovators, and industry leaders to shape the legal and policy frameworks driving Uganda’s next decade of economic transformation. Jointly convened by KTA Advocates, the Centre for Law, Policy and Innovation Initiative (CeLPII), and the Uganda Law Society. The summit is taking place from October 22–23, 2026, in Kampala, Uganda.

Share your thoughts @cipesaug.

Click here to access the event details.

When Smart Cities Turn Menacing

By Wairagala Wakabi |

In June 2025, Uganda switched on the Automated Electronic Penalty System (EPSAuto), using CCTV cameras, automatic number plate recognition (ANPR), and an intelligent transport monitoring system (ITMS) to fine motorists. But the system, ostensibly aimed at bringing order to the country’s chaotic roads, quickly generated controversy.

EPSAuto was suspended within days. More than a year later, on October 6, Ugandan Attorney General Sam Mayanja declared that the 2021 contract with a Russian company for the ITMS, including digital number plates and vehicle tracking, was legally void and unenforceable. The experience points to a bigger question confronting countries in Africa and elsewhere: what happens when the technologies introduced to make cities safer also make it easier for the government to identify and track its citizens?

A recent report,  Smart City Surveillance in Africa: Mapping Chinese AI Surveillance Across 11 Countries, identified more than US$2 billion in spending on the surveillance of public spaces in Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, although the real amount is likely much higher. And much of this financing came from Chinese companies.

The research finds no compelling evidence of smart-city surveillance reducing terrorism or serious crime in Africa. Senegal and Zambia have invested heavily in these systems despite facing relatively few security threats. In Mozambique, the technology — which, tellingly, is concentrated in opposition strongholds — has not improved the authorities’ response to serious crimes like kidnappings. Similarly, in Nigeria, heavy spending on surveillance has done little to stem insecurity.

This raises the problem of “function creep.” As the uproar around Uganda’s EPSAuto shows, there are concerns — often valid — that smart-city surveillance tools are being used to identify and monitor activists, opposition figures, critics, and protesters. The same unease was documented in Zimbabwe.

NB: The excerpts above are drawn from an article by Wairagala Wakabi published on Project Syndicate on October 21, 2026. The research, Smart City Surveillance in Africa: Mapping Chinese AI Surveillance Across 11 Countries, is available on open access.

Encryption As a Digital Rights Safeguard

By CIPESA Writer |

Encryption is increasingly caught between efforts to strengthen online safety and attempts by governments to expand access to private communications. For journalists, civil society organisations and opposition actors, weakening encryption can expose sensitive communications to surveillance and undermine their ability to work safely. As countries review laws and policies governing digital spaces, a key concern is how governments can address legitimate public safety concerns without undermining the security and privacy that encryption provides.

To mark Global Encryption Day on October 21, Global Partners Digital (GPD) has relaunched the World Map of Encryption Laws and Policies, an online tool that assesses and compares laws, policies and practices governing encryption across 100 countries. It shows how governments are protecting or restricting the use of the technology.

For African countries, where digital technologies increasingly shape civic participation, public debate, journalism and access to information, the map’s findings underscore the importance of treating encryption as a fundamental component of digital rights and security, especially as surveillance concerns rise.

The updated Map also examines the safeguards in place to prevent the abuse of government powers, helping users identify where national frameworks protect encryption and where they leave its use vulnerable to restrictions or interference.

The relaunch includes new research on 40 countries using an updated assessment framework.  More than 30 assessments were available at launch, with the remainder expected in the following weeks, while  60 countries remain covered by the previous framework. Each country page states the methodology and when the assessment was done, helping users to understand how current the findings are.

The research points to growing tensions in global encryption policy. Countries including Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada have passed laws or tabled proposals that seek to bypass traditional lawful access mechanisms and build access into encrypted communications. At the same time, GDP found that although online safety measures are increasing, relatively few have so far directly affected encryption.

Ellie McDonald, Policy and Advocacy Lead at Global Partners Digital, who also led the research project, said: “On one hand, we are seeing ever greater adoption of encryption, and on the other, muscular attempts to undermine it.” She added that the refreshed map aims to “help separate the speculative from the certain and to back up the field with up-to-date analysis.”  

The research also shows that the measures introduced in the name of safety or law enforcement can have implications that extend beyond their stated objectives, particularly when they weaken the security protections on which millions of people rely. This concern is echoed by African digital rights researcher Lilian Nalwoga, who notes, “Across Africa, efforts aimed at strengthening cybersecurity and digital sovereignty are eroding privacy, weakening encryption, expanding state surveillance, and enabling mass collection of sensitive biometric data. The map will serve as an advocacy tool for actors to demand stronger encryption in Africa.”

In African countries where human rights defenders, journalists, political opponents and dissidents, activists and civil society organisations may face surveillance, intimidation or restrictions on civic space, secure communications can be particularly important. Encryption can help protect sources, preserve the confidentiality of sensitive information and reduce the risk of communications being intercepted by unauthorised parties.

Research by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) has previously noted that many African countries have passed legislation that limits anonymity and the use of encryption, often citing the need to protect national security and to combat terrorism and crime. In practice, some governments have  used these restrictions to monitor the communications of critical journalists, human rights defenders, and opposition politicians. For instance the GDP encryption map, Ethiopia ranks severe for encryption intensity and weak for  procedural and institutional safeguards, while Zimbabwe and Nigeria rank severe for legislative and policy threats. Ethiopia in particular places a licensing requirement for providers of encryption products and services with importers of hardware and software containing cryptographic capabilities needing a security clearance certificate.

Weakening encryption therefore threatens not only the security of personal data, but also people’s willingness and ability to participate in public debate, report on matters of public interest and organise collectively. The challenge for policymakers is to address legitimate concerns about online safety and criminal activity without creating systemic weaknesses in digital security.

The right to privacy has come under increased attack in many African countries, with the proliferation of digital technologies being matched by state measures that negate this right. In the past few years, many countries across the continent have enacted various laws that permit surveillance, mandate telecommunication intermediaries to facilitate the interception of communication, stipulate the mandatory collection of biometric data, limit the use of encryption, require the localisation of personal data, and grant law enforcement agents broad search and seizure powers – Source: Privacy Imperilled: Analysis of Surveillance, Encryption and Data Localisation Laws in Africa

However, GPD’s updated research also identifies developments that demonstrate how policy can protect encryption and privacy. Chile has introduced a law that expressly protects the use of encryption, while Brazil’s Digital Statute of Children and Adolescents requires services used by children to have privacy by default. Meanwhile, several proposals that threatened encryption have been dropped or stalled in recent years. These include the European Union’s proposed ‘Chat Control’ proposal, a proposed encryption backdoor in Sweden and efforts to introduce VPN restrictions in the United Kingdom.

Engagement on encryption requires collaboration among civil society organisations, journalists, technical communities, policymakers and other stakeholders. It also requires clear, accessible evidence that distinguishes established law from proposals, and shows the potential consequences of weakening encryption. For African policymakers, regulators and civil society actors, comparative resources such as the World Map offer that evidence. They can help identify approaches that safeguard encryption, expose weaknesses in national legal protections and draw lessons from developments in other jurisdictions.

As artificial intelligence makes cyber threats increasingly sophisticated and scalable, strong encryption remains essential to protecting communications and personal data. Thus, African governments should ensure that efforts to address online harms and criminal activity do not weaken these protections.

How Spyware and Digital Surveillance Undermine Democratic Participation

By Jimmy Kainja |

Mobile devices such as smartphones, computers, and tablets have transformed how journalists, activists, public figures, and ordinary citizens access, produce, and circulate information. By connecting people to a global communication infrastructure, these technologies have expanded opportunities for public debate, civic engagement, and accountability. Yet the same technologies can also facilitate surveillance, particularly targeting individuals and groups whose work challenges established power structures.

These tensions were explored at a panel discussion titled Spyware on Trial: A Comparative Discussion Across Jurisdictions, held at the recent Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFAfrica26). The panel hosted by Media Defence examined how spyware operates within surveillance systems and how its effects extend beyond individual privacy, undermining journalism, collective organising, and democratic participation.

Spyware as Part of a Wider Surveillance Ecosystem

A key argument that emerged during the discussion was that spyware should not be seen as an isolated technology, but as part of a broader surveillance ecosystem. As one panellist observed, surveillance takes multiple forms, including physical monitoring and confiscating personal devices for further examination. Spyware, however, adds a distinct dimension because it enables remote, often less visible monitoring, increasing uncertainty about whether an individual’s communications, activities, or personal information are being accessed.

Importantly, the panellist argued that the mere possibility of surveillance can have consequences, even when there is no definitive evidence of its occurrence. The uncertainty surrounding spyware can generate fear and distrust, prompting individuals to reconsider whom they communicate with, what information they share, and whether they should continue engaging with particular networks.

As the panellist explained, although spyware’s effects may initially seem individual, their consequences extend well beyond the person targeted. Peers may stigmatise or ostracise individuals suspected of being compromised, weakening their relationships and isolating them from the networks on which their work depends. In this sense, surveillance can disrupt social relationships and collective action without necessarily targeting an entire organisation or movement.

The Chilling Effect on Journalism and Collective Organising

The investigative journalist on the panel reinforced this argument by recounting his own experience in Malawi. He explained that a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) leader who had pledged his support before the journalists were arrested and had their devices confiscated stopped communicating with the journalist after it became known that Malawian authorities had confiscated and tampered with his devices. The incident illustrated how the perceived risk of surveillance can undermine trust between journalists and their sources, even when the sources themselves have not been directly targeted.

The chilling effect of surveillance is often discussed in relation to freedom of expression, but it can be difficult to demonstrate how it operates in practice. This example provided a concrete illustration of how the fear of compromised communications can alter people’s behaviour and relationships. The NGO leader’s decision to stop communicating with the journalist suggests that the perceived risk of surveillance can be enough to discourage engagement, even in the absence of conclusive evidence that spyware has been deployed against a particular person or communication channel.

The implications extend way beyond individual privacy and a journalist’s ability to communicate freely. When people become reluctant to exchange information, attend meetings, or associate with individuals perceived to be under surveillance, the consequences can include restrictions on freedom of association, reduced opportunities for mobilisation, and weakened democratic participation. Surveillance therefore affects not only those directly targeted but also the wider networks and movements that depend on trust, communication, and collaboration. For civil society organisations and public interest groups, this can undermine the very relationships necessary for collective organising and movement building.

Device Confiscation, Legal Mechanisms, and Digital Surveillance

The panel also explored how surveillance operates across African countries through different but interconnected practices. These include physically confiscating mobile phones and computers, examining or manipulating seized devices, and using legal mechanisms to justify or facilitate their seizure. Once authorities possess devices, they may access sensitive information, examine communications, and expose confidential material. When spyware is installed, or devices are compromised and the risks may persist even after authorities return the devices to their owners.

The discussion also highlighted the use of law as an instrument to facilitate surveillance, a practice that may be understood as lawfare. In this context, legal powers can justify actions such as seizing activists’ devices, potentially creating opportunities to access information about their communications and networks. Panellists cited examples of the seizure and alleged tampering with activists’ mobile phones in Kenya, illustrating how these practices can affect people working on public interest issues across the region.

For investigative journalists, these practices pose a particular threat because their work often depends on maintaining confidential relationships with sources. Investigative journalists often handle sensitive information, and their sources often have a lot to lose, including the threat of death if their identities are known or disclosed. The security of a journalist’s device is therefore not merely a matter of personal privacy; it is also central to protecting their sources, preserving sensitive evidence, and ensuring that information can be reported in the public interest. When authorities confiscate or compromise devices, the consequences can extend to the people whose identities, communications, or disclosures may be exposed.

Reflecting on the impact of his arrest and the confiscation of his and his organisation’s devices, the Malawian journalist described the consequences for his work:

We’ve lost a big chunk of information that we used to get from the Anti-Corruption Bureau, and we’ve lost a good number of our sources because of the idea [that our gadgets spied on] that is being planted in our sources out there, making the job of journalists so difficult because you cannot just wake up one day and do the stories that we do without sources of information, so the impact of spyware is huge on the public. When investigative journalism fails, the biggest victim is the public.

This testimony highlights the broader public consequences of surveillance. The loss of sources and information does not merely inconvenience a journalist or compromise an individual investigation; it can also prevent important stories from reaching the public. When sources fear that their identities or communications may be exposed, they may withhold information about corruption, misconduct, or abuses of power. Investigative journalism becomes harder, and those whose actions might otherwise be scrutinised face fewer opportunities for public accountability.

Citizens ultimately bear the cost, as they depend on independent journalism to access information, assess the conduct of public institutions, and make informed decisions about public affairs.

Spyware and the Erosion of Democratic Freedoms

The discussion demonstrated that spyware raises concerns extending far beyond digital security and the protection of personal data. Its use, or even the perception that it is being used, can undermine several fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of association, and access to information. These freedoms are closely interconnected: citizens need to communicate freely, associate with others, and access reliable information to participate meaningfully in democratic processes. Although surveillance may target particular individuals, its broader effect can weaken the relationships and institutions that sustain public interest work and democratic participation.

A key insight from the panel was that understanding contemporary surveillance requires moving beyond a narrow focus on what a particular technology can do. The more important question is how spyware interacts with other surveillance practices, legal powers, institutional arrangements, and social relationships. Device confiscation, legal intimidation, digital monitoring, and the erosion of trust can reinforce one another, producing consequences greater than any single practice in isolation.

Looking Beyond the Technology

The session offered an important reminder that digital technologies are not inherently democratic or repressive; their effects depend substantially on how they are deployed, by whom, and within what political and legal contexts.

Addressing these challenges requires more than technical safeguards against spyware. It also demands scrutiny of the legal and institutional arrangements that enable surveillance, protection for journalists and their sources, and stronger accountability mechanisms to prevent the misuse of surveillance capabilities.

Ultimately, the question is not simply whether spyware can be brought to trial, but whether the broader surveillance ecosystem in which it operates can be subjected to meaningful democratic oversight. Without such scrutiny, technologies that promise greater connectivity and participation may instead contribute to an environment in which communication becomes a source of vulnerability and the exercise of fundamental democratic freedoms carries increasing risks.